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Abstract
Background: Mistakes in the identification and administration of drugs may be fatal. This is especially so in the practice of
anaesthesia. This is a report of 2 cases of near fatality due to mistakes in drug administration from look-alike medications.
Objective: To highlight the significance of medication errors in our practice and to discuss the best methods of prevention.
Method: A report of two cases of errors in the administration of drugs during the conduct of anaesthesia. The subsequent
management of the cases is presented, and the findings from the literature are discussed.
Result: In case 1, an adult male presented for herniorrhaphy and after induction with propofol 1mg/kg intravenously,
Pancuronium bromide injection 4mg was administered intravenously, in the place of suxamethonium chloride injection.
In case 2,  For induction of anaesthesia, 100mg of thiopentone sodium was administered in place of 25mg of the same
drug because Thiopentone 1gm vial was mistaken for Thiopentone 500mg vial in a 2 year old girl. In both cases, the errors
were detected early and there were no adverse sequelae.
Conclusion: Medication errors are a potential source of iatrogenic harm to patients undergoing anaesthesia. Strict adherence
to principles as well as constant vigilance would minimize this problem.
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B.M a 50 year old male farmer presenting with a
right inguino-scrotal hernia for herniorrhaphy
(RISH). Induction was with propofol 1mg/kg
intravenously. Endotracheal intubation was to be
faci litated by suxamethonium 0.5mg/kg
intravenously but the anaesthesia practitioner who
was assisting withdrew pancuronium bromide 4mg
and injected intravenously.
Oxygen was administered by facemask,
although after about 90 seconds, fasciculation was
not observed the patient was noticed to be well
relaxed. Laryngoscopy was done and upon
visualization of larynx, a size 7.5mm ETT was
inserted with ease. The plan was to allow the patient
breathe spontaneously and maintain with propofol
infusion and 30mg pentazocine intravenous bolus
for analgesia. After about 5 minutes the patient was
noticed not to be making any respiratory efforts.
Intermittent Positive Pressure Ventilation (IPPV) was
continued and the attending anaesthetist asked for
the drug ampoule. It was then discovered that
pancuronium 4mg ampoule had been mistaken for
a suxamethonium 100mg ampoule! IPPV was
maintained throughout the surgery. At the end of
surgery, residual paralysis was reversed with
neostigmine and atropine and the patient was
extubated. He recovered fully with no adverse
sequelae (see figure 1).
Figure 1:  Similar looking ampoules of
suxamethonium and pancuronium
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Case 2
A 2-year old child with Retinoblastoma was
booked for enucleation. At induction of anaesthesia
100mg of thiopentone sodium was administered in
place of 25mg of the same drug! Suxamethonium
chloride 12.5mg I.V was given and the child was
intubated with a size 2.5mm ETT.  It  was
observed  that  the  ventilation  had  to  be  assisted
for  over  10  minutes  before spontaneous
respiration was resumed. We were wondering
whether there was a prolongation in the effect of
suxamethonium. All the drugs drawn were cross-
checked only to discover that the anaesthetist had
mixed 1gm of thiopentone with 10ml and
thereafter had withdrawn 1ml (100mg) and
injected instead of the 25mg that was supposed to
be administered. (See figure 2) IPPV was continued
and monitoring, there were no untoward sequelae
in both cases.
Figure 2: Thiopentone 500mg and 1gm vials
Discussion
While there is relatively little information about drug
administration errors made by anaesthesiologists, the
available data suggest that anesthesia-related drug
administration errors are relatively common.
Prospective studies suggest that the error rate in
anaesthesia is around one error in every 133
anaesthetics1. There is a dearth of information in
the West-African sub-region about drug
administration errors among anaesthesiologists.
Mato and Fyneface-Ogan reported cases of drug
administration errors in a Nigerian Teaching
Hospital, which was mostly attributed to human
error2.
Drug administration  errors  appear  to  be
a  major  source  of   iatrogenic  harm to
hospitalized patients. Medication errors are
common throughout healthcare and result in
significant human and financial cost. A recent study
estimated that drug-related errors occur in one out
of five doses given to patients in hospitals3.
Administration errors were found to account for
38 percent of drug-related errors4, and the annual
cost of drug-related errors was estimated to be
approximately $2.8 million for a 700-bed teaching
hospital5.
In a survey of anaesthesiologists in New
Zealand, 12.5 percent of anesthesiologists
responding to the survey reported having harmed
patients by a drug administration error7. A
subsequent prospective study of 7,794 anaesthetic
procedures in New Zealand found an overall
incidence of drug administration error of 0.75
percent , based upon se lf-reporting by
anaesthesiologists8.
In order to obtain additional information about
drug administration errors in the anaesthesia care
setting, Bowdle9
 
reviewed the cases of drug
administration error contained in the ASA Closed
Claims Project database. There were 205 drug
errors, representing about 4 percent of the total
database of 5,803 cases. The proportion of the
database composed of drug errors has been
roughly constant, standing at 4 percent for the 1980s
and 1990s.9
There are several categories of medication errors
ranging from slips and lapses to fixation errors and
deliberate violations. Similarity in the presentation
and packaging of drugs is a major source of
mistakes in our practice just as was illustrated in
these case reports. The difference in drug
appearance between the generic and the brand
name product as well as differences in drug
appearance between different generic drug
manufacturers for the same medication represents
another important means by which patients may
experience moderate to serious consequences from
a medication error2.
Webster et al 8 classified drug errors in to the
following categories:
Omission:     drug not given
Repetition:     extra dose of an intended drug
Substitution:     incorrect drug instead of the
desired drug; a swap
Insertion:     a drug that was not intended to
be given at a particular time or at any time
Incorrect dose: wrong dose of an intended drug
Incorrect route: wrong route of an intended drug
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Other: usually a more complex event not fitting
the categories above
In this report, according to Webster’s
classification of medication errors, case 1 is an example
of a substitution while case 2 is an incorrect dose. In
1993 Russell10 examined the first 2000 incident
reports in the Australian Incident Monitoring Study
(AIMS). There were recommendations aimed at
avoiding drug errors.  There were 144 incidents
related to drugs: 58 syringe drug swaps and, of
these, 71% involved muscle relaxants. This follows
manager’s “80/20 rule”: which states that 80% of
the adverse events will come from about 20% of
the drugs11. Based on their f indings, they
recommended change in colour coding of syringes
by the drug types they contained. In 1993 there
were Standards for Drug Labeling in the USA12,
Canada13, and South Africa. The Australian Society
of Anaesthetists used the same basic colour scheme
as the three existing national standards13.
They also added some requirements in the lettering
design and on the quality of the label adhesive. They
made some recommendations on muscle relaxants:
colour identified by a strong red. Simply identifying
the relaxant syringes could avoid about 70–80% of
the syringe swap incidents.  To lock in the
relationship with red and relaxants, it was decided
to try to get a red syringe produced. This, it was
hoped, might reduce labeling errors and give a
clear indication of the relaxant syringe from all
angles (see figure 3).
Figure 3: Colour coded vials and syringes
The strategy of identifying the relaxants with the red
plunger syringes depends on strictly using the syringe
only for relaxants. In spite of this innovation, the
problem could not be resolved. Clearly identifying
relaxant drugs may help to avoid the very
distressing incidents of patients being paralyzed
because of a syringe   swap before anaesthesia is
induced. Although these recommendations are
being practiced in some other countries, they are yet
to be fully implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In
another recommended method for minimizing
medication errors, all labels are self-adhesive and
colored by class of drug, following an international
standard (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Self-adhesive and colored labels by
class of  drug, following an international
standard
Thus a medication error is an ‘error in the
prescription, dispensing, or administration of a
medication with the result that the patient fails to
receive the correct drug or the indicated proper drug
dosage’ (National Library of Medicine Medical
Subject Heading)14. It does not necessarily result in
injury. There is wide and sometimes interchangeable
use of  other terms such as ‘prescription error’, ‘drug
error’, ‘dose error’, ‘adverse drug event (ADE)’,
‘potential ADE’ and ‘preventable ADE’, used to
define the location of the error in the pathway
between pharmacy and patient more precisely or
indicate that a patient has been harmed14.
Medication error rates appear to be higher during
day shifts, when the majority of drug orders are
made, rather than at night.15,16 Inexperience might be
expected to contribute towards medication errors,
but the published evidence concerns prescription
error only. First-year residents are five times more
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likely to make prescribing errors than those with more
experience15.
There are many hidden problems in the hospital that
contribute to systems failure and prescription errors
were most likely to cause an ADE. Other latent
systems failures include, failure to check drugs before
administration, lack of communication, inadequate
monitoring of treatment or side-effects, and lack
of  standardization of  labels and protocols.14 It is
widely quoted that 80% of medication errors in
hospitals are caused by human error, the remainder
being due to equipment error.17 Previous studies have
shown that age, poly pharmacy and impaired renal
function14 predispose patients to ADEs.
In the index cases reported, the medication
errors reported occurred during day shifts and they
were both due to human error. There is little
information about the epidemiology of  medication
errors in anaesthetic practice in Sub-Saharan Africa.
There is a need therefore to conduct large scale studies
to find out the prevalence and incidence of
medication errors in anaesthetic practice in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This will be the basis on which
regional and national policies guidelines and strategies
of prevention of medication errors can be adopted
or adapted from other existing guidelines.
Recommendations
There is a need to study the incidence and
prevalence of medication administration errors in
anaesthetic practice in Sub-Saharan Africa. The use
of international colour coding for syringe labeling
and coloured syringes may reduce the occurrence
of  medication errors. When mistakes do occur the
patients should be resuscitated if necessary and
investigated properly. Critical incidents should be
reported in accordance with laid out guidelines.
Drug manufactur ing companies and
pharmaceuticals should be encouraged to make
their labels different and distinct from one another.
Conclusion
Medication errors can and do occur in anaesthetic
practice and are most often attributable to human
errors. Similar looking vials and ampoules may be a
common factor thus, anaesthetists should be trained
to be vigilant at all times during the conduct of an
anaesthetic. The  watchword for  all  anaesthetists
should  be “Eternal vigilance is the price of safety”.
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